Opinions

The Middle District of Georgia offers opinions in PDF format, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.

Please note: These opinions are not a complete inventory of all judges' decisions and are not documents of record. Official court records are available at the clerk's office.

Judge James P. Smith

The plaintiff contended that the debtor's obligation arising from a state court judgement for breach of fiduciary duty was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(4) and (6). The bankruptcy court held that collateral estoppel applied to the state court judgment and found that the debtor's intentional breach of fiduciary duty was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6). The bankruptcy court also found that the state court judgment for breach of fiduciary duty did not satisfy the requirement for nondischargeability for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity under § 534(a)(4).

Judge James D. Walker Jr. (Retired)

Creditor failed to state a claim for willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6), when the facts asserted in various legal proceedings, if taken as true, amount to nothing more than negligence.

When a judgment lien creditor fails to prove the invalidity of the debtor's exemptions, his lien will be avoided to the extent it impairs any exemptions.

Court imposed sanctions on a bankruptcy petition preparer for violations of § 110, including failure to provide complete social security number and unauthorized practice of law.

For purposes of the hanging paragraph in § 1325(a), a car is acquired for the ."ersonal use of the debtor,."when it is acquired for non-business purposes and for the primary use of the debtor as determined by the totality of the circumstances.

A debtor who transferred his interest in real property to his wife prepetition, could not claim an exemption in the property when his wife reconveyed the interest postpetition after a threat of avoidance by the trustee.

Robert F. Hershner, Jr. (Retired)

The debtor filed an amended Schedule C to claim as exempt a personal injury action. The trustee objected because the debtors had failed to disclose the personal injury action on their bankruptcy schedules and at the § 341 meeting. The court determined that the debtors had intentionally and fraudulently attempted to conceal the personal injury action and were barred from claiming an exemption in it.

The debtor was the guardian of his minor son who was injured in an automobile accident. The debtor, as guardian, received settlement proceeds of $15,500 and obtained a surety bond from the plaintiff. The probate court determined that the debtor had made numerous unauthorized expenditures and encroached upon the corpus of the settlement proceeds without leave of the court. The plaintiff, as surety, was called upon to pay the missing corpus to the successor guardian. The bankruptcy court determined that collateral estoppel applied to the probate court's determination and that the debtor's obligation to the plaintiff, as surety, was nondischargeable as a defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity under § 523(a)(4).

A state court ordered the debtor to pay criminal restitution of $112,450 for damages to the creditor's property. The court held that under binding circuit court precedent, the debtor's obligation was non-dischargable under § 523(a)(7).

Judge John T. Laney, III

Plaintiff filed complaint against Defendant in Superior Court alleging breaches of fiduciary duty under Georgia Partnership law. Defendant removed to bankruptcy court. Trustee intervened in Superior Court and filed answer and counterclaim. Trustee issued a bill of sale to the Defendant transferring any interest in business partnership to Defendant. Defendant erroneously believed this to automatically substituted him for the Trustee. Defendant failed to file an answer or other response within 10 days; thus, Defendant was in default. The "good cause" standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) governs whether a clerk.s entry of default should be set aside. The four factor test is (1) whether the defaulting party took prompt action to vacate the default; (2) whether the defaulting party provides a plausible excuse for the default; (3) whether the defaulting party presents a meritorious defense; and (4) whether the party not in default will be prejudiced if the default is set aside. Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. Sanyo Electric, Inc., 33 B.R. 996, 1001 (N.D. Ga. 1983), aff.d, 742 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1984). In this case, Defendant failed to satisfy the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th factors. Therefore, the motion to reconsider order striking Defendant.s untimely answer was denied.

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