The United States Trustee contended that the debtor was a "health care business" and asked the court to order the appointment of a "patient care ombudsman" under 11 U.S.C.A. §333. The court held that under the specific facts presented in evidence, the appointment of an ombudsman was not necessary for the protection of patients. The court did not decide the issue of whether the debtor was a "health care business."
Opinions
The Middle District of Georgia offers opinions in PDF format, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.
Please note: These opinions are not a complete inventory of all judges' decisions and are not documents of record. Official court records are available at the clerk's office.
Robert F. Hershner, Jr. (Retired)
Prior to filing for bankruptcy relief, the Chapter 11 debtor purchased director and officer liability insurance. The policies provided direct coverage to the directors and officers and indirect coverage to the debtor. The policies also paid for attorney fees incurred in defending a claim. The director and officers were entitled to have their claims paid before the debtor's claims were paid. Several creditors made claims against the directors and officers. The debtor did not object to the advancement by the insurance company of the directors and officers defense cost. The debtor, however, contended that the directors and officers should submit for review by the Court or the debtor a fee application for each advancement request. The directors and officers argued that the insurance company would monitor and review all defense cost requests and only pay reasonable costs and that review by the debtor or Court was not necessary. The Court was persuaded by this reasoning.
A creditor filed an adversary proceeding contending that the Chapter 7 debtors' discharge shall be denied under 11 U.S.C.A. § 727(a). The debtors moved to convert the Chapter 7 case to a Chapter 13 case. The creditor objected. The creditor contended the debtors had shown a lack of good faith and a lack of candor by filing inaccurate bankruptcy schedules and an inaccurate statement of financial affairs. The court granted the debtors' motion to convert, noting that the plain language of Section 706(a) provides that the debtors had a right to convert their case.
The debtor filed for bankruptcy relief the day after the creditor foreclosed on the debtor's residence. The debtor contended that his interest in his residence was not terminated before he filed for bankruptcy relief. The court held that the language of the deed to secure debt provided that the debtor's right and equity would not terminate until the creditor gave the purchaser at foreclosure title to the debtor's residence.
Judge James D. Walker Jr. (Retired)
The debtor's case was dismissed because she failed to obtain pre-petition credit counseling and she met none of the three exceptions to the credit counseling requirement.
In a Chapter 13 plan, a 910 claim must receive the greater of (1) the full amount of the claim without interest, or (2) the amount the creditor would receive if the claim were crammed down with Till interest paid on the value of the collateral.
In a Chapter 13 plan, a 910 claim must receive the greater of (1) the full amount of the claim without interest, or (2) the amount the creditor would receive if the claim were crammed down with Till interest paid on the value of the collateral.
In a preference action, a transfer made by the debtor extinguished two obligations. The first was a compensation obligation to an employee that arose at the same the transfer was made. The second was a guarantee obligation to the bank that arose prior to the time of the transfer. The Court found the purpose of the transfer was to satisfy the compensation obligation and, thus, was made "on account of" a contemporaneous debt.
Due to unavoidable financial distress, the debtors defaulted on a strict compliance order with respect to their mortgage. Prior to the default, they had complied with the order for 20 months. The order placed no limit on the duration of strict compliance. Although the Court generally grants stay relief upon strict compliance default, it may decline to do so in certain circumstances, such as those in this case ,when strict compliance is required beyond 18 months.
The debtors would not be denied discharge when the disappearance of certain business assets and business records occurred despite the debtor-wife’s efforts and intent to store them indefinitely. Furthermore, errors and omissions on the debtors’ schedules do not result in denial of discharge when those problems were caused by a combination of poor legal counsel and the debtors’ ignorance.