A Chapter 7 Debtor had a 1/5 interest in a vested remainder in real estate, and the Trustee moved the Court to close the case while still retaining jurisdiction over the remainder interest so that the Trustee could administer the asset when the interest became a fee simple. Assuming without deciding that the Court indeed has the power to close a case and retain jurisdiction over a remainder interest, the Court held that the Trustee did not meet its burden in showing that the benefits in retaining jurisdiction over this particular asset overcame the burdens.
Opinions
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Judge John T. Laney, III
The Court granted the Debtor's three objections to discharge against the same creditor when the creditor could not establish a chain of assignment for its claims. The Court discussed the basic federal rule that in bankruptcy, state law governs the substance of claims; the Court also examined Georgia state law cases illustrating the proper way to assign a claim.
The Court granted the Debtors' motion to voluntarily dismiss their Chapter 7 case after the Court determined the Debtors had not satisfied a two-pronged test: (1) Whether the Debtor can show cause to dismiss and (2) If the Debtor does show cause, whether the dismissal would prejudice creditors. The second prong was examined under a factors test.
Rescission of an erroneously filed cancellation of security deed does not effect a transfer of an interest of debtor in property, and therefore is not a preference. Cancellation of a security deed does not, without payment of the underlying debt, remove the lien. Consequently, rescission of the cancellation does not serve to reinstate the lien.
When only a portion of a judgment debt is nondischargeable, any prepetition partial payments on the debt that are not allocated by the parties shall be applied first to accrued interest, then to attorney fees, then to damages.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment on preference and fraudulent conveyance claims was denied because material facts were in dispute regarding the scope of a prior settlement agreement, the insider status of Defendant, and the value of services provided by Defendant.
Plaintiffs could not establish the dischargeability of a debt though application of collateral estoppel to a state court judgment for libel per se. The state court judgment did not establish that Debtor personally committed the libelous act or that the act was done intentionally rather than negligently.
Possible 910 creditor that failed to object to cramdown treatment could not seek modification of the debtor's plan after confirmation.
Chief Judge James P. Smith
The debtor pledged his truck to a pawnbroker. The debtor did not cure his default within the applicable time, and the truck was automatically forfeited to the pawnbroker. The debtor filed a Chapter 13 case and proposed to pay the pawnbroker as a secured claim. The pawnbroker filed a proof of claim and received preconfirmation adequate protection payments. When the debtor defaulted on his plan payments, his case was dismissed and the pawnbroker repossessed the truck. The debtor filed a second Chapter 13 case and contented that the pawnbroker had waived its ownership of the truck by filing a proof of claim in the first case and accepting adequate protection payments. The court held that under 11 USC § 349, dismissal of the first case returned the parties to the positions as they existed at the time of the filing and that the pawnbroker was the owner of the truck. The court denied the debtor's motion for turnover of the truck.
The chapter 7 trustee objected to the debtor's claim of exemption of an annuity pursuant to Georgia Insurance Code § 33-28-7. The trustee contended that the debtor's exemptions were limited to those allowed under Georgia's bankruptcy specific exemption statute OCGA § 44-13-100. The bankruptcy court agreed and held that the debtor could not claim her annuity as exempt in bankruptcy, pursuant the Georgia Insurance Code. The bankruptcy court also held that the annuity was not a spendthrift trust and thus, was not excluded from property of the estate pursuant to 11 USC § 541 (c)(2) because the annuity was not a trust.