In an adversary proceeding seeking to determine nondischargeability of a debt, the Court granted in part and denied in part the wife-defendant's motion to dismiss complaint and granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend complaint. The Court granted the motion to dismiss the fraud allegation because the allegation did not meet the particularity requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 (made applicable to adversary proceedings through Bankruptcy Rule 7009); the Court denied the motion to dismiss the embezzlement, larceny, and willful and malicious injury allegations because taking the allegations at face value and construing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, the complaint properly alleged all three. The Court granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend because the plaintiffs had not done anything justifying denial, and refusing to grant leave to amend without reason is an abuse of discretion.
Opinions
The Middle District of Georgia offers opinions in PDF format, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.
Please note: These opinions are not a complete inventory of all judges' decisions and are not documents of record. Official court records are available at the clerk's office.
Judge John T. Laney, III
In a lengthy opinion, the Court examined law of propely filed proofs of claim after several debtors objected to the claims filed by eCAST Settlement Corporation in each case. The Court limited the reach of its prior opinion, In re Stephens, 443 B.R. 225 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2010). The Court discussed compliance with Bankrupty Rule 3001 and Official Form 10 (on how a creditor can achieve prima facie validity for its proof of claim), the effects of noncompliance with Bankruptcy Rule 3001, and the proper procedures and allocation of burdens in deciding objections to claim. The Court ultimately sustained all three objections to claim.
A postpetition fire destroyed the debtors' house, resulting in insurance proceeds totaling $107,000.00, which the creditor bank held. The debtors filed a motion to use this cash collateral. Both parties agreed that the creditor bank was entitled to keep an amount equaling the payoff of the house note, but the parties did not agree on how the house note's dragnet clause (and subsequent credit transactions between the parties) affected the reach of the lien to further proceeds. The Court granted the debtors motion in part and denied it in part, allowing the debtors to keep the amount over the balance of the house plus the amount owed on a vehicle in which the creditor held a security interest. The car debt was treated in a confirmed Chapter 13 plan, and the creditor was bound by the terms of that plan.
Judge James D. Walker Jr. (Retired)
In the absence of a timely objection from the creditor, a plan that provided for surrender of the creditor's collateral in full satisfaction was not a bar to confirmation when the schedules indicated the value of the collateral exceeded the debt and the creditor presented no evidence to the contrary.
For purposes of dismissal or conversion of a Chapter 7 case under § 707(b), the court cannot conclude as a matter of law that student loans are always consumer debt or always nonconsumer debt. Characterization of student loans depends on a consideration of all the relevant facts.
Attorney-client relationship was not sufficient to establish fiduciary capacity for purposes of § 523(a)(4), when client had not entrusted any property to the attorney.
The debtors claimed as exempt a farm tractor as a motor vehicle and also as a tool of the trade. O.C.G.A. § 44-100-13(a)(7), (3). The court held that the farm tractor was not a motor vehicle under Georgia's exemption statutes because it was not designed to be used to transport people or property on roads. The court also held that the debtor-wife could not claim the tractor as a tool of the trade because she did not use the tractor and the tractor was not necessary for any work that she performed.
The Chapter 7 debtor contended that repayment of her $100,000 student loan debt would be a undue hardship and, thus, was dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). The debtor was 37 years old, not married, had no children or dependents or any physical or mental impairments. The debtor was completing her Master's degree and planned to pursue a Ph. D. degree. The court held that the debtor had failed to show that her current financial conditions were likely to continue in the future or that she had made good faith efforts to repay her student loans. The court held that the student loans were non-dischargeable.
Debtors/Homeowners sued mortgage company for violations of RESPA, Home Affordable Mortgage Program (HAMP), Georgia Fair Lending Act (GAFLA), Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA), Georgia Fair Business Practices Act (FBPA), promissory estoppel, and breach of contract, good faith and fair dealing. The court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, Rule 12(b)(c) on counts except for one alleged violation of RESPA.
The debtor filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint to dischargeability because the complaint was filed after the bar date. The plaintiff was not initially listed on the bankruptcy schedules and first knew about the bankruptcy just four days prior to the bar date under Rule 4007(c). The court held that equitable tolling and 11 USC § 523(a)(3)(B) allowed the plaintiff's motion to extend the bar date so that the plaintiff's complaint would be deemed to have been timely filed.