The debtor purchased an unimproved parcel of land. The debtors placed a mobile home upon the land. The mobile home was financed by a thrid party. The debtors later executed a mortgage on the land. The debtors filed for Chapter 13 relief, completed their plan payments, and obtained a discharge. The debt on the land was not paid in full through the Chapter 13 plan. The debtors contended that the mortgage on the land was not secured by their principal residence and was not protected by 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). The court held that the mobile home had become part of the land and that the mortgage had survived the debtor's bankruptcy.
Opinions
The Middle District of Georgia offers opinions in PDF format, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.
Please note: These opinions are not a complete inventory of all judges' decisions and are not documents of record. Official court records are available at the clerk's office.
Robert F. Hershner, Jr. (Retired)
The chapter 7 debtor's sole shareholder used his personal funds to pay the debtor's obligation to deposit certain escrow funds with an escrow agent. The shareholder contended that he was equitably subrogated to the debtor's right to receive a return of the escrow funds because the shareholder had personally guaranteed the debtor's obligations. The Court held that the shareholder had not personally guaranteed the debtor's obligation to deposit the escrow funds and that the shareholder had waived any right to subrogation. The Court held that the debtor's bankruptcy estate was entitled to the funds held by the escrow agent.
The defendant contended that a dispute concerning certain agreements was subject to binding arbitration. The court held that the agreements were contracts of insurance under Georgia law, § 9-9-2(c)(3) and were not subject to binding arbitration.
The Chapter 7 trustee asked the court to impose sanctions under Bankruptcy Rule 9011. The court determined that respondent has continued to relitigate virtually verbatim contentions of the trustee's fraud long after the court has ruled that the contentions have no merit. The court held that the respondent should be sanctioned under Rule 9011.
The Chapter 7 trustee asked the court to impose sanctions on the debtor under Bankruptcy Rule 9011. The court determined that the debtor has continued to relitigate virtually verbatim contentions of the trustee's fraud long after the court has ruled that the contentions have no merit. The court held that the debtor should be sanctioned under Rule 9011.
The Chapter 11 debtor filed an application asking the court to approve the employment of David Judah as attorney for the debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). The United States trustee argued that Mr. Judah was not a disinterested person because an attorney in Mr. Judah's law firm was an officer of a corporation that was owned by the debtor. The court held that Mr. Judah was not disqualified from representing the debtor. The court noted that the corporation had a legal existence separate and apart from its officers and shareholders.
Judge James D. Walker Jr. (Retired)
In a preference action, the creditor could not prove that its sole transaction with the debtor was in the ordinary course of business, because it neither received payment according to the terms set forth in its invoice, nor did it provide any evidence to show the transaction was within industry standards
Although debtor was a guarantor to a mortgage but had no ownership interest in the real property, the court granted stay relief so the creditor could confirm the foreclose sale, which could result in exposing the debtor to personal liability on a deficiency claim.
Court imposed sanctions on bankruptcy petition preparer for violations of § 110, including failure to identify himself on the petition and other documents he prepared, accepting fees without properly informing the debtor he is not an attorney, and unauthorized practice of law.
To prove fiduciary defalcation for purposes of § 523(a)(4), the plaintiff must establish the existence of a technical trust between the parties, including the imposition of trust duties. A statute that establishes a business relationship is insufficient to create such a trust.