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AUTOMATIC STAY

In re Buchanan, (01-10785, Adv. No. 01-1021, January 28, 2002 - The automatic stay does not require a creditor to release a prepetition garnishment. The creditor need only make a good faith effort to stop the garnishment, taking careful and deliberate steps to do so, such as staying the garnishment.

In re Goodman, (01-11542, October 15, 2001) - The Court held that the automatic stay applied to an arrest warrant that was issued against Debtor as a contempt sanction for his failure to respond to post-judgment discovery requests in a civil case. In addition, the Court held that the Plaintiff in Debtor’s civil case was responsible for taking affirmative steps to ensure the arrest warrant was not carried out.

In re Jordan, (03-50422, November 17, 2006) - Due to unavoidable financial distress, the debtors defaulted on a strict compliance order with respect to their mortgage. Prior to the default, they had complied with the order for 20 months. The order placed no limit on the duration of strict compliance. Although the Court generally grants stay relief upon strict compliance default, it may decline to do so in certain circumstances.such as those in this case.when strict compliance is required beyond 18 months.

In re Joiner, (01-11991, Adv. 02-01047, November 5, 2004) - The court denied the trustee’s motion to compromise an adversary proceeding for turnover when the action turned on a relatively simple issue state law cause of action in which the trustee had a probable chance of success, and the holders of the majority of unsecured claims opposed the settlement.

In re Thomas, (02-55026, November 5, 2004) - The court granted retroactive stay relief to validate a foreclosure sale when the creditor had no actual knowledge of the bankruptcy filing at the date of foreclosure and the debtor received no benefit from the real estate. Furthermore, the debtor had no equity in the property and it was not necessary to effectuate his Chapter 13 plan; thus the creditor was entitled to stay relief.

In re Waller, (05-50788, March 29, 2005) - Judge would not recuse himself when all Debtors’ complaints were based on negative judicial rulings and Debtors lacked any evidence that the rulings displayed the type of extreme antagonism that would render a fair judgment impossible.

AVOIDANCE

In re Houston Steel Fabricators, Inc., (05-50456, Adv. No. 05-05122) - When seeking summary judgment on a preference complaint, the plaintiff must do more than simply allege that the transfer caused the defendant to receive more than it would in a hypothetical liquidation. Such an allegation is a legal conclusion and the plaintiff must proffer some evidence on that point.

In re Johnston Industries, Inc., (03-40293, Adv. No. 05-04164, January 27, 2006) - When seeking summary judgment on a preference complaint, the plaintiff must do more than simply allege that the transfer caused the defendant to receive more than it would in a hypothetical liquidation. Such an allegation is a legal conclusion and the plaintiff must proffer some evidence on that point.

In re Johnston Industries, Inc., (03-40293, Adv. No. 04-04089, June 6, 2006) - Payments made by the debtor as guarantor for an employee’s debt may be recovered as a preference if the payments were made after a demand was made on the guarantee.

In re Johnston Industries, Inc., (03-40293, Adv. No. 04-04089, November 21, 2006) - In a preference action, a transfer made by the debtor extinguished two obligations. The first was a compensation obligation to an employee that arose at the same the transfer was made. The second was a guarantee obligation to the bank that arose prior to the time of the transfer. The Court found the purpose of the transfer was to satisfy the compensation obligation and, thus, was made "on account of" a contemporaneous debt. The satisfaction of the pre-existing guarantee debt was merely incidental and would not satisfy the requirement that the transfer was made on account of an antecedent debt.

In re Jones, (02-12496, 02-12497, December 12, 2003) - Court would not deviate from plain language of statute providing for avoidance of judicial lien in order to prevent windfall to debtors when there was neither certainty that a windfall would occur nor certainty that the Court could, by its decision prevent such a windfall.

In re Tessmer, (03-52631, March 1, 2005) - Creditor was enjoined from pursuing fraudulent conveyance action against nondebtor third party when the Trustee had settled a claim arising out of the same transaction pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 544(b).

In re Werner, (05-54200, Adv. No. 06-05101, March 22, 2007) - At issue in this preference action was whether a credit card charge used to pay a debt constituted an interest in property of the debtor. The Court found it did because the debtor could not have initiated and directed the transfer of funds from his credit card account if he had no interest in the funds.

CHAPTER 12

In re Saunders, (07-10557, November 29, 2007) - To be farm debt for purposes of Chapter 12 eligibility, the debt must have some connection to the debtor's farming activity. Using farmland as collateral for a debt that has no other relation to the farming operation is not sufficient.

CHAPTER 13 PLANS

In re Berger, (07-10112, June 1, 2007) - For purposes of plan confirmation, the plain language of § 1325(b) requires an above-median-income debtor.' projected disposable income to be determined in accordance with current monthly income minus expenses set forth in the means test in § 707(b). Debtors are not obligated to pay more than the disposable income calculated on Form B22C, regardless of any known changes in their expenses.

In re Byrd, (99-54163, May 1, 2000) - The secured status of a creditor should be determined for the purpose of Section 1325(a)(5)(B) based on collateral's confirmation date replacement value, but in a Chapter 13 case, secured status should be determined based on a value no less than the petition date liquidation value if the creditor's claim is secured by inherently depreciable collateral.

In re Clyde and Owens, (06-10776, November 29, 2006) - In a Chapter 13 plan, a 910 claim must receive the greater of (1) the full amount of the claim without interest, or (2) the amount the creditor would receive if the claim were crammed down with Till interest paid on the value of the collateral.

In re Dean, (06-10223) - In a Chapter 13 plan, a 910 claim must receive the greater of (1) the full amount of the claim without interest, or (2) the amount the creditor would receive if the claim were crammed down with Till interest paid on the value of the collateral.

In re Driskell, (94-51403, November 20, 2000) - Agreement of IRS is required if Chapter 13 debtor proposes to pay Section 507 priority tax claim held by IRS other than as provided under Section 1322(a)(2).

In re Green, (06-50410) - In a Chapter 13 plan, a 910 claim must receive the greater of (1) the full amount of the claim without interest, or (2) the amount the creditor would receive if the claim were crammed down with Till interest paid on the value of the collateral.

In re Jackson, (05-58183, March 6, 2006) - A vehicle purchased for the primary use of a nondebtor spouse did not fall within the scope of the hanging paragraph to § 1325(a) because the was not purchased for the "personal use of the debtor." When Congress has wanted to include family or household use within a provision it has done so expressly; it did not do so in the hanging paragraph.

In re Murphy, (07-50302, June 28, 2007) - A creditor with a 910 claim objected to confirmation because the debtor filed his case 915 days after purchasing a car. The Court overruled the objection, finding the timing was not a bad-faith attempt to run out the 910 clock, but rather resulted from the debtor's sincere efforts to negotiate a feasible payment plan. 

In re Roberts, (05-11325, March 17, 2006) - Numerous irregularities and misstatements in Debtor’s schedule and Chapter 13 plan did not demonstrate a lack of good faith sufficient to justify dismissal of the case. The errors gained Debtor no advantage and were promptly corrected.

In re Robinson, (06-10562, November 29, 2006) - In a Chapter 13 plan, a 910 claim must receive the greater of (1) the full amount of the claim without interest, or (2) the amount the creditor would receive if the claim were crammed down with Till interest paid on the value of the collateral.

In re Rouse, (03-12205, April 11, 2005) - The court has no authority to permanently enjoin a creditor from collecting payment from a guarantor and, therefore, could not confirm a plan over the creditor’s objection that contained such a provision.

In re Stevenson, (06-10729, November 29, 2006) - In a Chapter 13 plan, a 910 claim must receive the greater of (1) the full amount of the claim without interest, or (2) the amount the creditor would receive if the claim were crammed down with Till interest paid on the value of the collateral.

In re Vail, (05-18114) - In a Chapter 13 plan, a 910 claim must receive the greater of (1) the full amount of the claim without interest, or (2) the amount the creditor would receive if the claim were crammed down with Till interest paid on the value of the collateral.

In re Williams, (06-50556) - In a Chapter 13 plan, a 910 claim must receive the greater of (1) the full amount of the claim without interest, or (2) the amount the creditor would receive if the claim were crammed down with Till interest paid on the value of the collateral.

In re York, (01-11208, July 1, 2002) - The Court found Debtor failed to propose his plan in good faith based on Debtor’s dishonesty and fraud in his dealing with his creditors, his lack of candor toward the Court during his confirmation hearing, and his insincere motivations for seeking Chapter 13 relief.

CLAIMS

In re Alliance Aerospace, (01-52973, April 19, 2002) - Principals of Debtor guaranteed a debt owed by Debtor and secured the guaranty with certain of Debtor’s equipment. When Debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition, the guarantors filed a contingent claim. After the guarantors made a payment on the debt, the Court allowed them a secured claim for the amount of the payment.

In re Amron Technologies, (06-50508, September 2007) - An oversecured creditor may add post-petition attorney fees to its secured claim if the fees are reasonable and provided for by agreement or state statute, even if the creditor does not comply with Georgia.s 10-day notice requirement.

In re Amron Technologies, (06-50508, March 22, 2007) - Multiple creditors jointly loaned money to the debtor.each contributing $10,000.in exchange for a lien the debtor's assets. Only one of the joint lenders, Ms. LaGrange, filed a financing statement, which omitted the names of the other lenders. The Court concluded Ms. LaGrange was the only creditor with a secured claim; however, she was secured for the full amount due under the note and not just her $10,000 contribution.

In re Firstline Corp., (06-70145, August 23, 2007) - Court applied 13-factor test to determine that undocumented advances made by Debtor.s sole shareholder to Debtor were loans rather than capital contributions. Consequently, the shareholder.s unsecured claim was allowed.

In re Firstline Corp., (06-70145, August 27, 2007) - Court allowed unsecured claim when financial records of both the debtor and the creditor documented the claim as a trade debt.

In re Flager, (07-50293, June 8, 2007) - Multiple documents signed by the debtor when he borrowed money from the creditor to purchase a truck demonstrated the parties. intent to create a security agreement. The documents included a note, a bill of sale, and a title application that listed the creditor as a lienholder on the truck. Therefore, the creditor was entitled to be treated as a secured creditor in the debtor's Chapter 13 plan.

In re LJL, (01-51665, April 17, 2003) - Creditor’s proof of claim based on tort and contract damages would not be enforceable under state law, and thus was disallowed by the Court. The claim arose from a contract to perform automotive repairs, which did not give rise to an independent duty such that a tort action could be maintained. Furthermore, the terms of the agreement between the parties were so uncertain as to render the contract unenforceable.

In re Marray Automotive, (06-50035, Adv. No. 06-05026, June 8, 2007) - Court denied summary judgment on contract action because parties disputed essential terms of the contract.

In re McCommons, (02-52484, November 26, 2002) - When several pieces of sevarable collateral secure a single debt, a Chapter 13 debtor may satisfy Section 1325(a)(5) by retaining a portion of the collateral and surrendering a portion of the collateral.

In re Walker, (05-31974, December 21, 2006) - Debtor offered to guarantee credit extended to his company. The creditor declined to extend credit, but offered to provide products on COD terms. Consequently, the creditor rejected the offer of a guarantee and had no claim against debtor for the debts of his company.

CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS

In re Toland, (04-54126, August 8, 2005) - "Escrow agreement" under which a creditor secured by a lien on the debtor’s mobile home loaned the debtors additional funds was a separate contract from the mobile home loan contract rather than a modification of the mobile home loan contract. The escrow agreement contained no language of modification and contained a separate repayment schedule. Therefore, the claim arising out of the escrow agreement was not secured by the mobile home.

DEBTOR and CREDITOR RIGHTS

In re Johnston Industries, (03-40293, Adv. No. 03-04036, September 15, 2003) - Creditor sought to dismiss Debtor’s Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim for failure to state a claim on the ground that Debtor failed to allege an injury to a consumer. Court denied dismissal, concluding that Georgia’s UDTPA does not require an injury to a consumer.

In re Smith, (01-12537, Adv. No. 03-01004, October, 2003) - Debtor sought injunction of state criminal proceeding on grounds it was a subterfuge to collect debt. Court granted summary judgment to defendants because plaintiff failed to establish, pursuant to Younger doctrine, that the criminal case presented a threat of great an immediate injury or that an injunction was necessary to preserve to a federally protected right.

DEFAULTS

In re Jones, (99-55074, Adv. 01-05024, July 13, 2001) - The Court decided motions from two defendants to open default arising from violations of the automatic stay and discharge injunction. Court considered four factors. The motion of one defendant was denied because the Court found he was culpable in the default due to his failure to retain counsel despite repeated suggestions by the Court that he do so. The Court granted the motion of the other defendant, finding failure of its explanation to file answer to be sufficient to satisfy good cause requirement.

In re Jones, (99-55074, Adv. 01-05024, July 17, 2001) - The Court decided motions from two defendants to open default arising from violations of the automatic stay and discharge injunction. Court considered four factors. The motion of one defendant was denied because the Court found he was culpable in the default due to his failure to retain counsel despite repeated suggestions by the Court that he do so. The Court granted the motion of the other defendant, finding failure of its explanation to file answer to be sufficient to satisfy good cause requirement.

In re Jones, (00-51222, Adv. 01-05023, July 13, 2001) - The Court decided motions from two defendants to open default arising from violations of the automatic stay and discharge injunction. Court considered four factors. The motion of one defendant was denied because the Court found he was culpable in the default due to his failure to retain counsel despite repeated suggestions by the Court that he do so. The Court granted the motion of the other defendant, finding failure of its explanation to file answer to be sufficient to satisfy good cause requirement.

In re Jones, (00-51222, Adv. 01-05023, July 31, 2001) - The Court decided motions from two defendants to open default arising from violations of the automatic stay and discharge injunction. Court considered four factors. The motion of one defendant was denied because the Court found he was culpable in the default due to his failure to retain counsel despite repeated suggestions by the Court that he do so. The Court granted the motion of the other defendant, finding failure of its explanation to file answer to be sufficient to satisfy good cause requirement.

DISCHARGE

In re Boykin, (03-52112, Adv. No. 03-05165, April 26, 2004) - Debtors who were currently unable to make ends meet, were living a frugal existence, lacked marketable skills or the ability to acquire marketable skills, and had made some efforts to negotiate with their student loan creditors would suffer undue hardship if required to repay their student loans. Consequently, they were entitled to a discharge of those loans pursuant to § 523(a)(8).

In re Brown, (01-11429, Adv. No. 01-01033, May 14, 2002) - Debtor sought a determination that certain federal income tax liabilities were dischargeable. The Court held the taxes nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B) due to Debtor’s failure to file tax returns. Substitute returns completed by the IRS did not constitute returns under § 523(a)(1)(B) because they were not signed by Debtor and because Debtor refused to cooperate in their preparation. An installment agreement signed by Debtor did not constitute a return because it did not contain the information necessary to calculate tax liability.

In re Cirilli, (00-53735, July 13, 2001) - Plaintiff, ex-wife of the Chapter 7 debtor, objected to discharge of certain debts payable by debtor to her or for her benefit under a divorce decree. The Court granted plaintiff’s request under Section 523(a)(5) as to house payments because the Court found the payments are in the nature of child support. The Court granted plaintiff’s request under Section 523(a)(15) as to two credit card debts incurred during the marriage because plaintiff met the prima facie case for nondischargeability, and debtor failed to establish either of the two exceptions. In considering an exception to nondischargeability under Section 523(a)(15)(A), the Court adopted a four-factor test to determine that debtor had ability to pay the two debts.

In re Clegg, (05-11683, Adv. No. 05-01045) - The debtors would not be denied discharge when the disappearance of certain business assets and business records occurred despite the debtor-wife’s efforts and intent to store them indefinitely. Furthermore, errors and omissions on the debtors’ schedules do not result in denial of discharge when those problems were caused by a combination of poor legal counsel and the debtors’ ignorance.

In re Clegg, (05-11683, Adv. No. 05-01045) - No summary judgment on discharge objection for the debtors’ failure to preserve records when the movant fails to set forth facts showing that the available records are insufficient to determine the debtors’ financial condition

In re Dixon, (01-12461, Adv. No. 01-01009, April 29, 2002) - After Debtor’s discharge was granted, Plaintiff sought to file complaint to determine dischargeability of debt under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(15). The Court held that Plaintiff’s § 523(a)(5) claim could be filed at any time without leave of court and that Plaintiff could not file a claim under §§ 523(a)(2) and (a)(15) because she had missed the deadline for doing so set by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c). However, with respect to her § 523(a)(2) claim, Plaintiff could file a complaint under § 523(a)(3)(b) if her debt was neither listed nor scheduled and she had no actual knowledge of the bankruptcy prior to the deadline for filing a nondischargeability complaint. In addition, because Debtor’s case was a no asset Chapter 7, Plaintiff could file a nondischargeability complaint if her debt was unscheduled by fraud or intentional design.

In re Durrance, (04-51149, Adv. No. 04-05094, May 27, 2005) - In a § 523(a)(5) and (a)(15) action, the court found that the debtor’s divorce obligation relating to providing shelter for his ex-wife and children, including mortgage and utility payments, were in the nature of support and nondischargeable. The debtor’s obligation on a joint tax liability was a property settlement that could be discharged because the debtor lacked the ability to pay it.

In re Hill, (05-50350, Adv. No. 05-05115, June 6, 2006) - Allegations that debtor incurred debt through fraud offered no basis for dischargeability action against Chapter 13 debtor with pre-BAPCPA case.

In re Johnson, (01-51451, Adv. No. 02-5068, July 18, 2003) - Debtor’s student loans were discharged in full because they created an undue hardship. Debtor’s refusal to participate in William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program’s income contingent repayment plan did not preclude a finding that Debtor had made a good faith effort to repay his loans.

In re Knighton, (06-10492, December 19, 2006) - The debtor, who had filed a prior bankruptcy case five years earlier as a Chapter 13, converted to Chapter 7, and received a discharge, was eligible for a discharge in her current Chapter 13 case. The lookback period for determining whether a debtor is eligible for a discharge begins on the date the previous case was filed, not the date it was converted.

In re Smith, (00-10389, July 17, 2001) - In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, plaintiff sought to prevent discharge of a debt that was incurred during her marriage to debtor and that debtor was required to pay under a divorce decree. The Court denied plaintiff’s request under Sections 727(a)(2)(B) and (a)(4)(A) because debtor demonstrated a lack of fraudulent intent in omitting certain assets from the schedules accompanying his bankruptcy petition and later affirming the accuracy of the schedules. The Court denied plaintiff’s request under Section 523(a)(15) because the benefit of discharge to debtor, who struggled to maintain a job and to make utility payments, outweighed the detriment to plaintiff, who showed no similar financial difficulties and was relying on payment of the debt to enable her to satisfy future discretionary expenses.

In re Tucker, (06-50092, Adv. No. 06-05107, April 10, 2007) - Plaintiff.s PACA claim was nondischargeable due to defalcation by the debtor. Defalcation requires fiduciary capacity, which PACA creates by providing for an identifiable res, specifying fiduciary duties, and arising prior to and without relation to the wrongdoing creating the debt. In addition, defalcation requires some knowing wrongful conduct by the fiduciary. Here, the debtor diverted PACA trust funds to pay non-PACA debts.

In re Wright, ( 01-53376, Adv. No. 01-05154, June 10, 2002) - A creditor-farmer filed nondischargeability complaint under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(4) and (a)(6) against Debtor, a seed dealer, for failing to pay the creditor for seeds he had harvested during three growing seasons. With respect to § 523(a)(4) the creditor failed to show any statute or common law rule that gave rise to a fiduciary duty, thus failing to prove fiduciary fraud or defalcation. The creditor also failed to prove embezzlement and larceny because the facts indicated that Debtor intended to pay the creditor, thus demonstrating a lack of fraudulent intent. With respect to § 523(a)(6), the creditor failed to prove willful and malicious injury because he was aware of that Debtor had sold his seeds and had not remitted payment, and despite this knowledge, the creditor failed to take steps to protect his property.

In re Wright, (01-55623, Adv. No. 02-5055, March 28, 2003) - After debtor sold creditor’s collateral out of trust, creditor sought determination of nondischargeability under §§ 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), and (a)(6). Under § 523(a)(2)(A) the creditor could not prove a false representation by imputing the fraud of one corporate principal to another, nor could the creditor prove justifiable reliance when it failed to follow its procedures for monitoring collateral. Similarly, under § 523(a)(6), the creditor could not show willful and malicious injury when the debtor was current on loan payments and creditor failed to monitor its collateral. However, creditor proved elements of § 523(a)(2)(B), and debtor could not escape liability under that section by choosing to remain willfully ignorant of his company’s financial situation.

DISMISSAL

In re Payne, (04-12403, June 10, 2005) - The court dismissed the debtors case for substantial abuse under § 707(b) because the debtors had the ability to make a substantial repayment to their unsecured creditors and they engaged in a pattern of choosing themselves over their creditors.

ELIGIBILITY

In re Dillard, (06-30128, December 11, 2006) - The debtor's case was dismissed because she failed to obtain pre-petition credit counseling and she met none of the three exceptions to the credit counseling requirement.

EXEMPTIONS

In re Burnett, (03-54157, December 12, 2003) - Under amendment to Georgia homestead exemption, married debtor who held full ownership interest in martial property could claim $20,000 homestead exemption, even though his wife had not filed bankruptcy.

In re Green, (04-11742, December 17, 2004) - Applying the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(1), the court allowed a married debtor filing individually to take a $20,000 homestead exemption when his residence was titled solely in his name, even though debtor and his spouse had been separated for 20 years and she maintained a separate residence.

In re Jones, (02-12496, Adv. No. 05-01024, November 16, 2005) - The debtor claimed an exemption of $1,000 in certain land and indicated that he intended to maximize his exemptions to the extent allowed by law. The court held that because he exempted all the value available in the property, he had exempted it in full and was entitled to any appreciation.

INJUNCTION

In re Smith, (01-12537, Adv. No. 03-1004, June 12, 2003) - A debtor who seeks to enjoin a criminal prosecution for bad checks can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by showing (1) a threat of great and immediate injury by alleging some bad faith in the criminal case; and (2) the necessity of an injunction to protect a federal right by showing that he is unable to raise a defense in the state court based on his allegation of bad faith.

LEASES AND EXECUTORY CONTRACTS

In re Bell, (07-50003, May 15, 2007) - Pursuant to the Tennessee Rental-Purchase Agreement Act, a contract governing a storage shed rented by the debtors was a lease rather than a security interest. The Court ordered debtors to modify their Chapter 13 plan to provide for payment of the lease in accordance with § 365.

PLEADING

In re Parker, (02-10618, Adv. 02-1015, September 3, 2002) - Creditor filed a complaint of objection debtor’s bankruptcy case. However, because the complaint contained no allegations, even when read liberally in creditor’s favor, that would entitle him to relief under Section 523(a) or any other provision of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court granted the debtor’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the adversary proceeding.

PROCEDURE

In re Amron Technologies, (06-50508, Adv. No. 06-05081, January 9, 2007) - The defendants in default were not allowed to file a late answer because they offered no excuse for the default.

In re Cheely, (01-51028, June 26, 2002) - Debtor sought to reopen his case to add a previously unlisted creditor and subsequently enforce the discharge injunction against that creditor. The Court concluded that the real issue was whether the creditor was subject to the discharge injunction. Because allowing the Debtor to reopen his case to add the creditor would not answer that question, the court denied Debtor’s motion to reopen.

In re Cotton, (06-51580, Adv. No. 06-05125, March 26, 2007) - The Court remanded adversary proceeding to state court because the claims were premised solely on state law and no bankruptcy case was pending. 

In re Gray, (04-11803, March 1, 2005) - Debtor, a U.S. citizen who lived and worked in Mexico, satisfied venue statute for purposes of filing in the Middle District of Georgia when all his assets in the United States were located in that District.

In re Jones, (99-55074, Adv. 01-05024, July 31, 2001) - Debtor sought to enjoin state criminal proceedings against him on the ground that they violated the discharge injunction. Defendant made a motion to dismiss. The Court abstained from exercising jurisdiction over the case because debtor failed to make an adequate showing of the extraordinary circumstance that the prosecutions were commenced in bad faith.

In re Jones, (00-51222, Adv. 01-05023, July 20, 2001) - Debtor sought to enjoin a state criminal proceeding against him on the ground that it violated the discharge injunction. Defendant made a motion to dismiss. The Court abstained from exercising jurisdiction over the case because debtor failed to make an adequate showing of the extraordinary circumstance that the prosecution was commenced in bad faith.

In re Phelps, (02-52995, March 29, 2005) - Under Eleventh Circuit’s Parker case, judicial estoppel can never be a defense to a cause of action omitted from the debtor’s bankruptcy schedules. Therefore, the Court allowed Debtor to reopen his case to add the cause of action so a trustee could administer the asset. His creditors stood to benefit from any recovery, and Debtor would receive no special benefit.

In re Roberts (03-51856, Adv. No. 03-05225, September 15, 2003) - The Court rejected Georgia’s assertion of sovereign immunity in a dischargeability proceeding on the basis that states surrendered their sovereign immunity with respect to bankruptcy when they ratified the Constitution.

In re Robinson, (00-54312, August 15, 2003) - The fact that Debtor remedied the financial problems that led to dismissal of her Chapter 13 case did not warrant reinstatement of her case.

In re Smith, (07-50410, Adv. No. 07-05062, November 30, 2007) - Court denied defendant.s motion to dismiss fraudulent conveyance claim for failure to state a claim. The Court found the fact of debtor's bankruptcy filing provided a sufficient factual basis.for purposes of notice pleading.for the trustee to allege fraudulent intent and insolvency at the time of transfer.