This matter came before the Court on the United States Trustee's limited objection to confirmation of the Debtor's Subchapter V plan. One impaired class of creditors in the Debtor's plan did not submit a ballot. The Debtor argued that the plan could be confirmed under § 1191(a) as a consensual plan. The Trustee said that, because of the non-voting impaired creditor, it must be confirmed under § 1191(b). The Court found that silence cannot be construed as an acceptance and confirmed the plan under § 1191(b).
Opinions
The Middle District of Georgia offers opinions in PDF format, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.
Please note: These opinions are not a complete inventory of all judges' decisions and are not documents of record. Official court records are available at the clerk's office.
Judge John T. Laney, III
This matter came before the Court on a motion for summary judgement filed by the Plaintiff, Mike Moon Investments Inc., against the Debtor-Defendant, Angela Schronce. The Plaintiff asked the Court to either validate the foreclosure sale of the subject property or annul the stay as to the foreclosure. The Court found that, as a matter of law, genuine issues of fact remained and denied summary judgement.
This matter required the Court to determine whether the Court could permit the modification of a debtor's plan to distribute an asset of the estate beyond the five-year restriction in § 1329(c). The Court found that the plain language of the statute did not allow it. Because the creditor-movant could not be afforded relief in the Chapter 13 case, the Court found that closure of the debtor's bankruptcy case was appropriate.
This matter came before the Court on the Defendant's renewed motion to dismiss. The Court found that the Plaintiff's Count I for fraud sufficiently pled the element of justifiable reliance to sustain a claim under § 523(a)(2)(A). The Court also found that the Plaintiff's Count III did not and could not pled the existence of a trust to invoke a fiduciary duty under § 523(a)(4) so dismissed the Plaintiff's Count III with prejudice.
This matter came before the Court on the Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Defendant claimed the Plaintiff's brief had a several pleading deficiencies which warranted dismissal. The Court agreed and granted the motion as to Counts I and III but denied the motion as to Counts II and IV.
This matter came before the Court on an objection to confirmation by the Creditor, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, of the Chapter 13 plan filed by Barry Simmons, the Debtor. The Court found that the value of the Debtor's property was less than the amount of the first mortgage, making the mortgage filed by the Creditor eligible to be crammed down under § 506(a)(1). The Court also found Georgia law allows only the interest of one joint tenant with right of survivorship to be encumbered by indebtedness. Finally, the Court found, under Georgia law, that a non-filing spouse benefits from lien release at discharge if the non-filing spouse was not also a co-signatory on the underlying debt.
This came before the Court on the Debtor's motion for the Court to reconsider or vacate its previous memorandum opinion and order in this case. The Debtor argued that the Court made a manifest error in law in annulling the automatic stay and validating the foreclosure of the property at controversy in the case. The Court found, under Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Rule 9023, no manifest error of law or fact was made in the Court's previous opinion. Therefore, the Court denied the Debtor's motion.
Chief Judge Austin E. Carter
This matter came before the Court on a claim objection. Creditor’s claim was based on a North Carolina judgment that was domesticated in Georgia. The claim based post-judgment interest on Georgia state law. Creditor objected on the grounds that the issuing state’s rate controlled over the domesticating state’s rate.
The Court held that the domesticating state’s rate controlled because post-judgment interest is a procedural mechanism rather than a substantive right and because of the underlying statutory scheme regarding domestication of foreign judgments. The Court further held that because the original judgment was on a contract, post-judgment interest accrued at the contract rate, in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12(b). The claim objection was overruled.
This matter came before the court on motion of two creditors to extend the time to file to file a motion for reconsideration of an order, so that the motion was considered filed within the appeal period under Rule 8002. The creditors waited until the eleventh hour to file their motion to reconsider but encountered CM/ECF difficulties (not caused by the court), and were unable to file the motion within the appeal period of the order for which they sought reconsideration. The Court denied the motion based on the plain language of Rule 9006(b)(2), which expressly prohibits the extension of time for filing under Rules 7052, 9023, and 9024, all of which were cited by the creditors as bases for their motion for reconsideration. The court therefore denied the creditors motion to deem the late-filed motion for reconsideration timely or extend time for which to file.
Judge Robert M. Matson
The Chapter 12 trustee filed an application for compensation, requesting statutory percentage fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 586(e) on payments the debtor made to secured creditors at a pre-confirmation sale closing. The debtor objected to the application, arguing the trustee is not entitled to collect the statutory percentage fee on the payments at issue.
The relevant statutory language states the trustee “shall collect such percentage fee from all payments received by [the trustee] under plans.” 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(2). Construing this language, the Court concluded the trustee was not entitled to collect the statutory fee because the payments at issue were not “received by” the trustee but rather disbursed directly to secured creditors at closing.