Opinions

The Middle District of Georgia offers opinions in PDF format, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.

Please note: These opinions are not a complete inventory of all judges' decisions and are not documents of record. Official court records are available at the clerk's office.

Judge Robert M. Matson

In re Thomas (Ch. 13 Case No. 24-10535-RMM) 2025-05-12

A creditor secured by a security interest in the debtors’ manufactured home objected to confirmation of the debtors’ Chapter 13 plan because the plan did not provide for full payment of the claim, but rather proposed to reduce the secured claim to the value of the manufactured home. The debtors' plan, argued the creditor, was an impermissible cramdown under the hanging paragraph of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a), as the manufactured home was purchased within 910 days of the petition date. The debtors contended the hanging paragraph of § 1325(a) did not apply to the claim because the manufactured home was not a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. § 30102 and, thus, was not a “motor vehicle” purposes of the hanging paragraph of § 1325(a).

The Court concluded the debtors’ manufactured home was not a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. § 30102 and the hanging paragraph of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). The Court found its conclusion supported by (1) the plain meaning of 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(7); (2) persuasive authority; and (3) official guidance provided by the federal agency tasked with administering the relevant motor vehicle laws.

In re Willman (Ch. 7 Case No. 20-50365-RMM, Adv. Proc. No. 21-5012-RMM) 2025-03-18

A Chapter 7 trustee moved for summary judgment on three claims seeking to avoid a debtor's transfer of real property: (1) under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) as well as § 544(b) and state law, as a transfer made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor holding a non-dischargeable claim; (2) under 11 U.S.C. § 549(a), as an unauthorized post-petition transfer of estate property; and (3) under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), as a preference. The Court denied the motion as to all three claims.

The debtor came into ownership of the real property at issue by virtue of a family member's death in May 2012. In November 2018, the debtor executed a deed to this property in favor of the defendant, the debtor's uncle. The debtor filed a Chapter 7 petition with his spouse on February 24, 2020, and did not disclose the transfer or any interest in the property. The deed to the debtor's uncle was recorded post-petition, in August 2020.

As to the claim asserting actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud, the debtor and defendant submitted affidavits disputing fraudulent intent and offering an innocent explanation for the transfer. As asserted in these affidavits, in June 2012 the debtor orally agreed to sell the property to the defendant in exchange for monthly payments until an existing mortgage was paid off, which occurred in fall 2018. The Court concluded these affidavits presented a genuine issue of material fact over the debtor's intent, precluding summary judgment.

As to the claim asserting an unauthorized post-petition transfer of estate property, the Court concluded a genuine issue of material fact existed over whether and to what extent the debtor owned the property at issue as of the petition date, and thus over whether the transferred property constituted property of the estate. The sale transaction described by the defendant, if true, amounted to an installment land sale contract under which the defendant obtained legal and equitable title in fall 2018.

As to the claim asserting a preferential transfer, the trustee contended summary judgment was appropriate under the facts as asserted by the defendant. The trustee, however, did "not accept the truthfulness of" the facts as asserted by the defendant. The trustee, therefore, failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that undisputed facts show entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

In re American Dental of LaGrange, LLC (Ch. 11 Case No. 24-10485-RMM, Adv. Case No. 24-01004-RMM) 2025-01-31

Creditor of a corporate Subchapter V debtor filed a complaint seeking a determination of nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1192 and 523(a)(2), (3), and (6). The debtor moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting three bases for dismissal: (1) the discharge provisions of § 1192—and, by extension, the discharge exceptions in § 523(a)—apply only to a debtor who confirms a plan under 11 U.S.C. § 1191(b), and do not apply to the debtor, whose plan was confirmed under § 1191(a); (2) even assuming the debtor’s plan was confirmed under § 1191(b), § 1192 does not change the scope of the discharge exceptions identified in § 523(a), which apply only to individual debtors, not to corporate debtors; and (3) the debtor is not eligible for a discharge because under § 1141(d)(3), a corporate debtor who confirms a liquidating plan and stops operating a business receives no discharge.

The Court concluded dismissal was warranted because the discharge provisions of § 1192 (and thus the discharge exceptions on which the creditor relied) do not apply to a debtor whose plan was confirmed under § 1191(a). Because the debtor’s plan was confirmed under § 1191(a), the creditor failed to state any claim under § 523(a) upon which relief could be granted. This ruling mooted the need to decide whether § 523(a) applies to a corporate debtor who confirms a plan under § 1191(b), an otherwise complex issue causing widespread disagreement in the courts. Finally, the Court concluded that while § 1141(d)(3) may prevent the debtor’s discharge, it provided no alternative grounds for dismissal at the pleading stage, due to questions of fact regarding whether the debtor’s plan had been consummated and whether the debtor’s postconfirmation activities constituted engaging in business.

In re Wilson (24-51245-RMM) 2024-12-27

Creditor moved to dismiss individual Subchapter V debtor’s Chapter 11 case for cause under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) on the basis that the case was not filed in good faith. The same creditor also objected to the debtor’s designation as a small business debtor and election to proceed under Subchapter V, arguing the debtor failed to qualify as a “small business debtor” as defined in 11 11 U.S.C. § 101(51D). After an evidentiary hearing on these matters, the Court denied the motion to dismiss and sustained the objection to the debtor’s designation as a small business debtor.

As to the motion to dismiss, the creditor advanced four arguments as to why the case was not filed in good faith: (1) the case was filed to evade an imminent adverse decision in the creditor’s prepetition lawsuit; (2) the debtor’s prepetition and postpetition conduct exhibited lack of good faith; (3) the case was essentially a two-party dispute; and (4) the debtor maintains a lavish lifestyle and is not the “honest but unfortunate” debtor.

The debtor testified at length in opposition to the creditor’s motion to dismiss and objection. After considering this testimony, as well as debtor’s apparent efforts to restructure debts in good faith, the Court concluded the creditor failed to meet its burden that the bankruptcy case was not filed in good faith.

As to the objection, the creditor advanced three arguments for why the debtor failed to qualify as a small business debtor: (1) the debtor was not engaged in commercial or business activities on the petition date; (2) the debtor had not shown that not less than 50% of his of his noncontingent, liquidated aggregate secured and unsecured debts arose from commercial or business activities; and (3) the debtor’s debts did not arise from his commercial or business activities.

The Court rejected the creditor’s first argument and concluded “commercial or business activities” should be broadly construed. Although the debtor’s income came from being a W-2 employee, the debtor’s managerial role with and equity ownership in his employer showed that the debtor was engaged in commercial or business activities on the petition date.

The creditor’s second argument, however, was meritorious. Of the debtor’s non-insider debts, the debt to this particular creditor was the only debt that could have arisen from commercial or business activities. But this debt, as the Court concluded, was not liquidated. The debt was for damages arising out of the debtor’s alleged solicitation of his former employer’s customers and employees. The debt was not liquidated because parties’ contract did not provide for liquidated damages, the debt had not yet been reduced to judgment, and the debt was not otherwise capable of being readily determined and precisely calculated. The debtor therefore failed to meet his burden of proving that not less than 50% of his noncontingent, liquidated aggregate secured and unsecured debts arose from commercial or business activities.

Because the Court found that the creditor’s debt was not liquidated, there was no need to rule on whether the debt arose from commercial or business activities of the debtor.

Chief Judge Austin E. Carter

In re Farnham (24-30325-AEC) 2025-04-03

This matter concerns whether an attorney violated Rule 9011 by filing documents alleging, and later advocating, that a pair of creditors colluded with the Debtor to obtain a sham judgment in furtherance of a conspiracy to defraud this Court as well as other creditors of the Debtor. 

The creditors moved for sanctions against the attorney, asserting that he repeatedly made false allegations in pleadings and later advocated for those positions.  The Court agreed.  The Court determined that the allegations were factually frivolous.  Further, the Court examined the attorney’s litigation practices and papers filed, and determined the attorney filed the pleadings with an improper purpose. 

Accordingly, the Court found the attorney violated Rule 9011.  The Court admonished the attorney, struck the offending allegations from the pleadings, and awarded the recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in filing and prosecuting their motion for sanctions.

In re Farnham (23-30610-AEC) 2024-12-20

Two related creditors sought reconsideration of their denied motion to reconsider. 

After the court entered an opinion and order denying a motion to reconsider its order dismissing the debtor's chapter 13 case, the creditors filed a second motion to reconsider.  The court denied the second motion.  In this order, the court addressed a debtor’s rights under § 1307(b), a debtor’s eligibility under § 109(e), and the application and elements of Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052, 9023, and 9024 (and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52, 59, and 60).

In re Farnham (23-30610-AEC) 2024-09-06

The question presented in this case is whether a debtor has an absolute right to dismiss a chapter 13 case under § 1307(b), provided the case has not been converted previously, or whether the court may deny a debtor’s request to dismiss a chapter 13 case for cause. 

On the Debtor’s request, the Court dismissed the chapter 13 case while a motion to convert, filed by a group of creditors, was pending.  The creditors requested the Court set aside its order dismissing the case, arguing that the Debtor did not have the right to dismiss his case without creditors being afforded the opportunity to oppose the dismissal by arguing what they contended is the Debtor’s bad faith, misconduct, and ineligibility for chapter 13 relief.

The Court ruled in favor of the Debtor, finding the language of 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) unambiguous, and holding that a debtor has an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss a chapter 13 case provided the case was not previously converted under §§ 706, 1112, or 1208.  Accordingly, the Court sided with the majority position after evaluating both majority and minority approaches connected to § 1307(b).

 

Judge John T. Laney, III

In re Chipley's Family Restaurant, LLC and Corner Oyster House, LLC (Ch 11 Case No. 23-40451-JTL, Adv. Case Nos. 24-04004 and 24-04005) 2024-09-06

This matter came before the Court on one issue of the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The Defendants argued that these cases should be dismissed under Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure Rule 7012 incorporating Federal Rule Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(3). The Defendants argue that venue is improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1409(b). The Court found that 28 U.S.C. § 1409(b) does not restrict the venue for cases “arising under” title 11 and venue is proper.

In re Trimax Medical Management (23-51628) 2024-05-20

This matter came before the Court on objections filed by Creditor Mr. David Field and the Sub V Trustee Ms. Jenny Walker to the confirmation of the small-business reorganization plan of Trimax Medical Management, Inc. The Creditor objected to the plan under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(3), (7), and 1191(b). The Court found that the Debtor met its burden under those sections and overruled the Creditor’s objection. The Trustee announced a resolution to one of her objections during the hearing, which the Court approved, and otherwise overruled her outstanding objection. The Court, therefore, approved confirmation of the Debtor’s plan.

 

In re Ward (Ch 7 Case No. 22-70600-JTL, Adv. Case Nos. 22-07012, 22-07013, 22-07014, 22-07016, 22-07017, 22-07018) 2024-02-12

This matter was tried before the Court beginning on January 31, 2024. The Plaintiffs requested their debts be excepted from the Defendant’s discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A). The Court found that the Plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof and found in favor of the Defendant.

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