The Court held a hearing on two Motions of Samuel P. Scott ("Movant") for Relief from the Automatic Stay to pursue an action against Jackie G. and Patricia A. Willliams and Circle B Enterprises, Inc. ("Respondents") in state court. Under the test articulated in In re South Oakes Furniture, Inc., 167 B.R. 307 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1994)(J. Walker), Movant was entitled to relief from the stay because the hardship to Movant to start over in Bankruptcy Court outweighed any hardship to Respondents if the case proceeded in state court where it had been pending for almost two years. Under the final prong of the test, the Court held that Movant had established a probability of prevailing on the merits.
Opinions
The Middle District of Georgia offers opinions in PDF format, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.
Please note: These opinions are not a complete inventory of all judges' decisions and are not documents of record. Official court records are available at the clerk's office.
Judge John T. Laney, III
The Court held a hearing on the Application for Interim and Final Compensation for the Responsible Person of SGE Mortgage Funding Corp. and Attorneys for SGE Mortgage Funding Corp. ("Movants") and the objection to the application by the Committee of Investors Holding Unsecured Claims ("Respondent"). Respondent challenged Movants request for compensation on numerous grounds including incompetence and mismanagement. Under relevant case law, once a prima facia case is made by an applicant, any objection must be substantiated by evidence showing that the applicant requested an unreasonable amount. The Court held that Respondent did not meet its burden and approved Movants’ application for interim and final compensation.
Ruling on the United States Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss Case or to Transfer Venue, the Court held under Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992), the Court has no discretion to retain a case which was filed in the wrong venue. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406, in the interests of justice, the Court ordered the case transferred to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Alabama.
The Court held a hearing on cross-motions to enforce a settlement agreement. SGE Mortgage Funding Corp. ("Plaintiff") and Accent Mortgage Services, Inc. ("Defendant") filed the motions after a dispute arose over the terms of the settlement agreement. The Court held in favor of Plaintiff, stating that Defendant’s CEO was "sophisticated in business matters" and Defendant’s counsel present when the CEO signed an amendment to the settlement agreement which confirmed Defendant’s liabilities under the settlement agreement. Therefore, Defendant was liable for the amount remaining due to Plaintiff under the settlement agreement, plus ad valorem taxes paid by Plaintiff at a real estate closing.
The Court held a hearing on the Motion of Arthur Geeslin, Jr. ("Debtor") for Contempt against Meriwether County District Attorney Peter Skandalakis ("Respondent") for violations of the automatic stay and the discharge injunction. The Court held that it had the inherent power to determine violations of the automatic stay and the discharge injunction, despite Respondent’s sovereign immunity argument. Further, the Court ruled: 1) the exception to the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) did not apply to the actions taken by Respondent; 2) the debt was discharged, despite the language of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7); and 3) because damages were not proven, the issue of sovereign immunity would not be reached. The Court reserved judgment on issuing an injunction because an adversary proceeding had not been filed.
In the adversary proceeding regarding the complaint filed by Douglas McArthur Byrd ("Debtor") to recover property of the estate, Atlanta Casualty Company ("Defendant") made a Motion for Summary Judgment. After ruling on several evidentiary issues, the Court held in favor of Defendant stating that Debtor’s material misrepresentation that he did not know whether his vehicle had been found, when he had been told by the police six days earlier that the vehicle had been recovered, violated the Cooperation and Fraud & Misrepresentation clauses of Defendant’s automobile insurance policy. Therefore, as a matter of law, Defendant was not required to pay Debtor for his alleged loss.
The Court held a trial to determine the dischargeability of debt created by losses that International Fidelity Insurance Company ("Plaintiff") suffered after Raymond Jerry Baxter’s ("Debtor") company went out business and Debtor filed for bankruptcy. After stating that Plaintiff did not meet its burden required by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B), the Court held in favor of Debtor, stating that Plaintiff only proved its own company policy, not the industry norm. However, the Court held in favor of Plaintiff on the 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) allegation, as to jobs performed in New York state, if Plaintiff can prove during the damages stage that Debtor or his company misappropriated funds from the project owner(s). The issue of damages was reserved for a later trial after all job(s) are completed and an accurate accounting of losses can be done.
The Court held trial on Sarah P. McGinnis’ ("Plaintiff") Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Student Loan Debt against Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency ("Defendant"). The Court, analyzing "undue hardship" under the Brunner test in view of Education Credit Management Corp. v. Carter (In re Carter), 279 B.R. 872 (M.D. Ga. 2002), held Plaintiff’s debt to be dischargeable as an undue hardship. The Court cited Plaintiff’s short-term and long-term financial difficulties due to "a total foreclosure of job prospects in her area of training," as well as her good faith effort towards repayment, as reasons for holding that Plaintiff would be subject to an undue hardship if she were forced to repay her student loans.
Ruling on Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency’s ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court stated that Education Credit Management Corp. v. Carter (In re Carter), 279 B.R. 872 (M.D. Ga. 2002), set a very high standard for undue hardship. However, the Court could not make such a determination as a matter of law because there were genuine issues of material fact which remained in dispute. The Court denied Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court held that statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly complied with. The court ruled against Speedee Cash of Columbus, Inc. ("Defendant") because the title pawn contract did not strictly comply with the Georgia Pawnshop Act. Since Defendant’s contract was not in strict compliance, it was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.