Debtors filed a motion to compel the mortgage company to pay a mortgage insurance premium which the Debtors alleged was an item required to be paid through escrow. Approximately one month before hearing on Debtors motion was held, the mortgage company paid the premium and reinstated the mortgage insurance policy. Although the motion was moot, Debtors requested to recover attorney fees from the mortgage company for bringing the motion. Failing to find any statutory authority authorizing the recovery of attorney fees, the court denied Debtors request.
Opinions
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Please note: These opinions are not a complete inventory of all judges' decisions and are not documents of record. Official court records are available at the clerk's office.
Judge John T. Laney, III
The court abstained from ruling in this adversary proceeding and dismissed Debtor’s complaint without prejudice. Although the Georgia Department of Revenue’s motion to dismiss was based on its Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court made no conclusion as to the immunity issue. Rather, the court held that no bankruptcy purpose would be served by making a determination of Debtor’s tax liability to the Georgia Department of Revenue in a no-asset case where Debtor had received her discharge.
The court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of its April 3, 2001 order which denied Plaintiffs’ motion to open default. Because of the relief sought, the court construed Plaintiffs’ motion to open default as a motion to extend the time to file an amended complaint. Given Plaintiffs’ six month delay in moving for an extension without an explanation for the delay, the court found that the delay was not the result of excusable neglect.
In two related chapter 11 cases in which a single estate was created, the court granted, in part, Debtors’ motion for determination of their tax liability to the Muscogee County Board of Tax Assessors. The motion sought a determination of the value of Debtors’ personal property for the 1996 through 2000 tax years. The court determined the value of Debtors’ personal property for the 1997 through 2000 tax years and ordered the Muscogee County Board of Tax Assessors to recalculate Debtors’ tax liability in accordance with the court determined values. However, Debtors’ tax liability for the 1996 tax year had been adjudicated by an administrative tribunal prior to the filing of Debtors’ bankruptcy cases. Therefore, pursuant to § 505(a)(2)(A), the court was without jurisdiction to determine Debtors’ tax liability for the 1996 tax year.
In Defendant’s motion to set aside the entry of default, the court found that "good cause" under Rule 55(c) existed. Although the pro se Defendant’s excuse for failing to file a timely answer was questionable, the court held that the strength of Defendant’s meritorious defense outweighed the weakness of his excuse. Therefore, the court granted Defendant’s motion to set aside the entry of default.
The court granted the State of Florida’s motion to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the State of Florida constructively waived its sovereign immunity by participating in the Federal Income Tax Refund Offset program. The court acknowledged the case of College Savings Bank in which the Supreme Court overruled Parden and held that these Parden-type constructive waivers of sovereign immunity are unconstitutional.
The court granted the Debtor’s motion for summary judgment against the 544 individual investor defendants. Referencing its Memorandum Opinion entered on November 19, 2001, the court held that the Georgia Uniform Commercial Code, not the Georgia real estate recording statutes, applied to the transactions between the Debtor and the individual investor defendants. Therefore, because the evidence demonstrated that none of the individual investor defendants had possession of the original loan documents in which they claimed an interest, the court held that the individual investor defendants had an unperfected interest in the loans.
In cross motions for partial summary, the court granted in part and denied in part the motions of several commercial bulk purchasers and denied the motion of the Creditors’ Committee. The court held that the transactions between the Debtor and several commercial bulk purchasers did not involve the creation of an interest in real estate. Therefore, the Georgia Uniform Commercial Code, not the Georgia real estate recording statutes, governed those transactions between SGE and the bulk purchasers of promissory notes. As to whether the commercial bulk purchasers were holders in due course of the promissory which they purchased from the Debtor, the court found that issues of material fact remained on the elements of good faith and notice. The court entered a separate Memorandum Opinion on the Debtor’s motion for summary judgment.
Debtor obtained an order from the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Georgia to conduct an examination of a nondebtor party pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004. The nondebtor party moved to quash the subpoena asserting that the proper court to issue the subpoena was the court for the district in which the Rule 2004 examination was to take place. Denying the motion, the court held that the proper court to issue such subpoena was the court for the district in which the case is pending.
The court denied Debtors’ motion for contempt to compel Respondent to pay Debtor’s attorney’s fees. Explaining that the court’s prior order awarding Debtors attorney’s fees was a money judgment, the court held that a money judgment is not enforcement by contempt. Therefore, the court concluded that Debtors’ counsel recourse was filing a fi. fa rather than obtaining a contempt order.