This matter comes before the Court by cross motions for summary judgement filed by Plaintiff, AgGeorgia Farm Credit, ACA, and Defendant, Deere & Company in an adversary proceeding to determine the priority of liens on a tractor. The Court found that the Debtor’s name on Deere & Company’s UCC filing statement was seriously misleading, giving AgGeorgia the priority lien on the tractor over Deere’s lien. Neither actual notice of Deere’s lien nor res judicata affected AgGeorgia’s lien priority. Therefore, the Defendant’s motion for summary judgement is denied and the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgement is granted.
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Judge John T. Laney, III
The Defendant moved to dismiss and for sanctions this adversary proceeding because the Plaintiff failed to produce his exhibits in anticipation of trial. The Court orally ordered the Plaintiff to produce his exhibits by October 30, 2020 and, after the Plaintiff failed to comply, the Court again ordered the Plaintiff to produce his exhibits by January 10, 2021. The Court heard the motion on March, 4, 2021, at which point the Plaintiff had still not produced his exhibits. The Court found that, because of the Plaintiff’s failure to produce his exhibits and failure to comply with Court orders, along with other delays throughout the Plaintiff’s prosecution of the case, the Plaintiff had demonstrated a “clear record of delay” and “lesser sanctions would not suffice”, the standard for dismissal in Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, the Court dismissed the adversary proceeding as a sanction.
Debtor Antonio McCants objected to Proof of Claim No. 14 filed by Creditor Georgia Community Bank F/K/A the Citizens State Bank of Taylor County. The Creditor included $15,461.85 of fees and expenses from the prior case. The Debtor argued that, for these fees and expenses, the Creditor failed to file notice pursuant to Rule 3002.1(c) in his previously dismissed bankruptcy case, the Creditor failed to file notice pursuant to Rule 3002.1 in this case, and § 1327(a) binds the Creditor to the specific provisions of the plan. The Court held that the Creditor’s claim survived the dismissal of Debtor’s previous case regardless of whether the Creditor filed notice, Rule 3002.1 does not apply to the Creditor in this case because the property no longer served as the Debtor’s primary residence, and the plan’s provisions allow for the collection of the fees and expenses. Therefore, the Court denied the Debtor’s objection.
The Chapter 7 Trustee moved for the Court to approve a proposed settlement to resolve an adversary proceeding, Kelley v. Lee, et al. AP 18-07009. Synovus Bank objected to the settlement. After reviewing the four factors bankruptcy courts consider when approving settlements outlined in In re Justice Oaks II, Ltd., 898 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir. 1990), the Court found the Trustee carried his burden and the proposed settlement was within the range of reasonableness. Therefore, the Court approved the Trustee’s settlement.
Movant U.S. National Bank Association, not in its Individual capacity, but solely as trustee for RAMC Trust, Series 2016-CTT, moved for relief from the stay because Respondent’s proposed chapter 11 plan failed to provide adequate protection to the Movant. The proposed chapter 11 plan modified the mortgage on debtor’s principal residence, in violation of § 1123(b)(5). Therefore, the Court grants Movant’s motion for relief from the stay.
Movants, The Otis Overby Co. and Steven Mark Overby moved to reopen the chapter 7 bankruptcy case of Respondent Christine Marie Ray. Movants allege that technical difficulties with CM/ECF prevented their timely upload of an objection to dischargeability. The Court found that, if the case was reopened, Movant would still be barred from relief under FRBP Rule 4007(c). Therefore, the Court denied Movant’s motion to reopen case.
Creditor Nissan moved for relief from stay against Debtor and objected to Debtor’s confirmation plan. Nissan alleged that the transaction between Nissan and Debtor for the vehicle was a true lease and, additionally, that Debtor’s plan lacked sufficient adequate protection. Debtor, in response, argued that the lease was not a true lease and instead was a disguised security agreement. The Court found the lease to be a true lease and granted the motion for relief from stay; the Court also agreed that the offered adequate protection was insufficient and sustained Nissan’s objection to confirmation.
In this case, the Trustee brought a Motion for Sanctions against a Pro Se Debtor. The Trustee alleged that the Debtor filed a complaint to open an adversary proceeding in violation of F.R.B.P. 9011. After a hearing on the motion, the Court found that Debtor did violate Rule 9011 and therefore sanctions were appropriate. The Court determined that the appropriate sanction for this matter was to dismiss the adversary proceeding.
In this adversary proceeding, a Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff-Debtor’s claims under FRCP 12(b)(6). Plaintiff’s claims, in order, were 1) Wrongful Foreclosure, 2) Fraud, and 3) Violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA). The Court found that Plaintiff was able to allege sufficient facts to potentially state a claim for Claim I but not for Claims II or III. As a result, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion with respect to Claims II and III but denied Defendant’s Motion with respect to Claim I.
This case concerns a Trustee’s action under 11 U.S.C. §544(a)(3) to avoid a transfer of real property and subsequent cross Motions for Summary Judgment. The initial complaint alleged that the Trustee was able to avoid the transfer because the Deed to Secure Debt for the property in question was improperly attested to and thus, incapable of providing constructive notice to bona fide purchasers. The Court held that the Deed to Secure Debt did provide constructive notice and granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.