This case concerns a student loan discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). Based on allegations in the initial complaint Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the debt was incurred post-petition and is therefore non-dischargeable. Before the Court heard Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, the Court granted the Debtor leave to amend the complaint. The Court held that the amendments cured the deficiencies that the Defendants contended were grounds for dismissal.
Opinions
The Middle District of Georgia offers opinions in PDF format, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.
Please note: These opinions are not a complete inventory of all judges' decisions and are not documents of record. Official court records are available at the clerk's office.
Judge John T. Laney, III
This case concerned whether the one-year extension of the § 546(a) statute of limitations begins to run from the appointment of the interim trustee or upon concluding the § 341 meeting of creditors. The court concluded that the appointment runs from concluding § 341 meeting when creditors decline or otherwise fail to elect a trustee. This result, the court reasoned, is mandated by § 546(a)’s reference to appointment under § 702. That section appoints the interim trustee as the “permanent” case trustee. Additionally, the court rejected the argument § 702 merely recognizes the interim trustee’s continued appointment if no trustee is elected, as § 701(b) explicitly terminates the appointment of the interim trustee upon concluding the § 341 meeting.
This case concerns whether the Chapter 13 debtors could cram down a claim secured by a purchase money security interest (PMSI) in a motor vehicle purchased for non-personal use within one year of the petition date. The undesignated paragraph following 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9), often referred to as “the hanging paragraph,” prohibits debtors from cramming down claims secured by a PMSI if purchased within particular time periods. A 910-day limitation applies to claims secured by “a motor vehicle (as defined in section 30102 of title 49) acquired for the personal use of the debtor.” A one-year limitation applies to claims secured by “any other thing of value.” The Court concluded that the first provision applies narrowly to motor vehicles acquired for the debtors’ personal use. All other collateral, including motor vehicles not acquired for the debtors’ personal use, are subject to the one-year limitation provided in the second provision.
This opinion arises from an adversary proceeding seeking to revoke the confirmation order in a Chapter 13 case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1330. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff could not overcome his defenses as a matter of law. First, the defendant asserted res judicata and collateral estoppel defenses, as the plaintiff did not raise his allegations of fraud prior to confirmation. The court held that § 1330 did not require that a party seeking revocation discover the fraud after the court’s entry of the confirmation order.
Secondly, the defendant argued that, because the claimant did not hold an allowed claim, he was not a party in interest and accordingly, lacked standing to assert the action. The court, however, determined that a party does not need to hold an allowed claim to seek revocation of a confirmation order and dismissal of Chapter 13 case.
The defendant also claimed that the plaintiff should be judicially estopped from making certain allegations because he had made prior inconsistent statements in a prior proceeding. The court noted that the plaintiff had offered sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to determine that the statements were not made to make a mockery of the judicial system.
Lastly, the defendant claimed that the complaint failed to state a claim for relief because it was based on the plaintiff’s belief that the defendant made fraudulent statements. Although the court determined that the plaintiff must meet the heightened pleading standard under Rule 9, the court found sufficient allegations in the complaint to support that burden.
Therefore, the court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
This case was before the court on a Rule 12 motion to dismiss. The defendant argued that the complaint failed to state a claim for relief because a prior state-court judgment resolved the claim and thus, res judicata prevented recovery. The court, however, determined that the complaint neither incorporated the state-court judgment nor sufficiently described the state court’s findings to create grounds for dismissal under Rule 12. Because the court would have to consider documents outside the pleadings to determine the merits of a res judicata defense, the court denied the motion.
In this case, the Chapter 7 trustee sought summary judgment on an action to determine the secured status of a claim on the Debtor’s real estate. The claim was secured by a recorded security deed. Subsequently, two instruments were recorded canceling the security deed; the instruments, however, were signed and recorded by a party without a recorded interest in the property. The record indicated the instruments were recorded in error. The holder of the claim argued that, because the party signing the instruments was a stranger in title, a hypothetical purchaser would have had inquiry notice of the error. The Court disagreed. It held that, because the instruments stated the claim was assigned to the signors of the instruments and otherwise complied with Georgia law, the instruments were neither inconsistent nor facially deficient. Thus, a bona fide purchaser—such as the trustee—could rely on the statements within the instruments.
This opinion concerns a preference action seeking to avoid the attachment of a judicial lien on the Debtors’ real estate. The issue before the Court was whether the judicial lien was created within 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A)’s look-back period. The Trustee, the plaintiff in the case, argued that the lien was created when the judgment was recorded in the applicable county’s general execution docket. The Defendant argued the entry of the judgment, which occurred outside the look-back period, created the judicial lien and that recording merely perfected that lien. The Court determined that, by operation of O.C.G.A. § 9-12-86(b), only recording a judgment creates a judicial lien on real estate. Therefore, for purposes of the preference action, the transfer occurred within the applicable look-back period.
This case came before the Court on the Debtor’s motion to reconsider the entry of various orders pursuant to FRBP 9024. The Court discussed the requisite showings a movant must demonstrate to support a request for relief. Particularly, the Court explained that a movant must show it has a meritorious defense when seeking relief from default. To carry this burden over an objection, the movant cannot merely offer putative defenses or general denials; the movant must show evidence that he could substantiate the defenses. The Debtor in this case did not put on any evidence. Accordingly, the Court denied his motion.
In these cases, the Chapter 7 Trustee sought to avoid pre-petition payments made to insiders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(2). After an extensive trial, the Court ruled in favor of the Defendants. Although the Court found the Debtor was insolvent at the time it made the payments, the Court did not find the Trustee met his burden to show the insiders had reasonable cause to believe the Debtor was insolvent. The opinion discusses the legal standards and the evidence presented by the parties.
In these cases, the Chapter 7 Trustee sought to avoid pre-petition payments made to insiders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(2). After an extensive trial, the Court ruled in favor of the Defendants. Although the Court found the Debtor was insolvent at the time it made the payments, the Court did not find the Trustee met his burden to show the insiders had reasonable cause to believe the Debtor was insolvent. The opinion discusses the legal standards and the evidence presented by the parties.