On Summary Judgement the Court was asked to decide a narrow issue regarding federal tax liens. Specifically, the issue before the Court was whether accounts receivable acquired by the debtor more than 45 days after the filing of a notice of tax lien on the debtor's property may be considered proceeds of contract rights acquired by the debtor prior to the expiration of that 45 day period, so as to give the security interest of a commercial creditor in the receivables priority over the tax lien. The Court held that payments received by the Debtor under its contract after the filing of the tax liens were identifiable proceeds of contract rights, rather than accounts receivable. Therefore, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 6323(a) and (c) the Bank's prior perfected security interest in the contract payments is senior to the IRS's tax lien.
Opinions
The Middle District of Georgia offers opinions in PDF format, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.
Please note: These opinions are not a complete inventory of all judges' decisions and are not documents of record. Official court records are available at the clerk's office.
Judge John T. Laney, III
The matter came before the Court on debtor’s Motion for Contempt against the Internal Revenue Service. The debtor argued that because the IRS’s proof of claim classified her year 2002 tax debts as general unsecured and because the discharge order discharged all general unsecured debt, that the Chapter 13 discharge order encompassed the 2002 tax debt. Accordingly, the debtor’s motion sought to hold the IRS in contempt for violation of the discharge injunction based on the IRS’s attempt to collect the 2002 tax debt. The Court held that the tax debt was non-dischargeable, and therefore the IRS did not violate the discharge injunction by attempting to collect the 2002 tax debt.
The creditor who financed the debtor's vehicle purchase was named as a lienholder on the vehicle title certificate, despite the debtor not having signed a security agreement. The debtor moved the Court to order the creditor to remove its name from the title. Under Florida law, which applied to this case, notation on a title certificate does not in itself grant a security interest--the security interest must be in a separate, written document. The Court held that the creditor was unsecured and granted the debtor's motion.
The Chapter 7 trustee moved for summary judgment in an adversary proceeding seeking to avoid the debtor's allegedly fraudulent transfers to the debtor's son. In a lengthy opinion, the Court held that the record contained many disputed issues of material fact arising from the defendant's argument that the debtor was merely returning property belonging to the debtor. The Court also examined the impact of the 2010 amendments to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
In response to two pro se adversary complaints, the debtor moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, for a more particular statement, and to strike allegations. The Court addressed, at length, each of the debtor's objections to the complaints. The Court granted in part and denied in part the debtor's motions, and the Court gave the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaints.
In response to two pro se adversary complaints, the debtor moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, for a more particular statement, and to strike allegations. The Court addressed, at length, each of the debtor's objections to the complaints. The Court granted in part and denied in part the debtor's motions, and the Court gave the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaints.
The Court granted the Chapter 7 trustee's motion to reconsider an order denying the trustee's motion to reopen. The Court reexamined Johnson v. Alvarez (In re Alvarez), 224 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2000), and concluded it mandated the result that Georgia's discovery rule does not apply when determining whether a cause of action is property of the estate.
The Chapter 7 trustee moved to reopen a closed case to administer settlement proceeds as property of the estate. The settlement was on account of a injury caused by prepetition by prescription medication, but the debtor did not know the cause of the injury until after the bankruptcy case was closed. Georgia's discovery rule states that a cause of action does not accrue until a plaintiff knows what caused the injury. Inconsistent Eleventh Circuit authority put the Court in a difficult position, but the Court denied the trustee's Motion to Reopen. The debtor's product liability lawsuit did not accrue under Georgia law until he knew the cause of his injury. Because the lawsuit did not accrue prepetition, the settlement proceeds were not property of the estate.
The plaintiffs in this adversary proceeding moved to amend its complaint after the time to amend as a matter of right had passed. The plaintiffs wanted to add facts they were aware of but forgot to tell their attorney. The defendants objected to the amendment as an attempt to delay, as creating further expenses, and as untimely. The Court found that the defendants had not put forth any facts or legal arguments demonstrating any prejudicial delay or undue expenses. The Court further concluded that the amendments can be read such that they do not add a new claim and thus need not relate back to the original complaint, and even if the amendments added a new claim, the new claim would arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out in the original complaint, and thus the amendments would relate back.
The Chapter 7 trustee sought information and documents from the former law firm of several entities, including the debtor, owned and operated by nondebtor individuals, including information regarding related entities the law firm never represented. The law firm alleged attorney-client privilege, alleged work-product immunity, alleged that nondebtor entities were not proper targets of Rule 2004 examinations and for subpoenas demanding the production of documents. The Court denied the debtor's former law firm's motion to quash the Chapter 7 trustee's Supboena for Production of Documentary Evidence Under Bankruptcy Rules 2004(c) and 9016, and overruled the law firm's objection to the trustee's Motion for Bankruptcy Rule 2004 Examination and for Production of Documents Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004 and Bankruptcy Rule 9016. The owner-operators of the entities executed a broad waiver disclaiming any attorney-client privilege and granting the trustee the right to assert or deny and privilege. In holding that the work-product immunity had been waived, the Court adopted the reasoning in In re ANR Advance Transportation Company, Inc., 320 B.R. 607 (E.D. Wis. 2003). The Court further ordered that the examination and production of documents take place at the law firm's place of business and that the trustee pay for the costs of copying documents.