Pursuant to the Tennessee Rental-Purchase Agreement Act, a contract governing a storage shed rented by the debtors was a lease rather than a security interest. The Court ordered debtors to modify their Chapter 13 plan to provide for payment of the lease in accordance with § 365.
Opinions
The Middle District of Georgia offers opinions in PDF format, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.
Please note: These opinions are not a complete inventory of all judges' decisions and are not documents of record. Official court records are available at the clerk's office.
Judge James D. Walker Jr. (Retired)
Plaintiff's PACA claim was nondischargeable due to defalcation by the debtor. Defalcation requires fiduciary capacity, which PACA creates by providing for an identifiable res, specifying fiduciary duties, and arising prior to and without relation to the wrongdoing creating the debt. In addition, defalcation requires some knowing wrongful conduct by the fiduciary. Here, the debtor diverted PACA trust funds to pay non-PACA debts.
The Court remanded adversary proceeding to state court because the claims were premised solely on state law and no bankruptcy case was pending.
Multiple creditors jointly loaned money to the debtor.each contributing $10,000.in exchange for a lien the debtor's assets. Only one of the joint lenders, Ms. LaGrange, filed a financing statement, which omitted the names of the other lenders. The Court concluded Ms. LaGrange was the only creditor with a secured claim; however, she was secured for the full amount due under the note and not just her $10,000 contribution.
At issue in this preference action was whether a credit card charge used to pay a debt constituted an interest in property of the debtor. The Court found it did because the debtor could not have initiated and directed the transfer of funds from his credit card account if he had no interest in the funds.
Creditors were entitled to stay relief on an expedited basis because the Debtor was ineligible for Chapter 13 at the time he filed his case.
Judge John T. Laney, III
The Court finds that there is no issue of material fact remaining to be determined and that MSDW has carried its burden of proving that § 546(e) is applicable to bar the Trustee from avoiding the transfers in question. As such, MSDW’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to all counts of the Trustee’s Amended and Restated Complaint.
The discharge of student loans is reserved for those most extreme instances of financial destitution. It is the Court’s finding that this debtor finds herself in such a situation. The Court holds that Debtor has carried her burden of proving, under the standard set forth in In re Brunner and adopted by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Cox, that excepting Debtor’s student loan debt from discharge would impose an undue hardship on Debtor and her dependent son. As such, the student loan debt at issue, representing loans made by ECMC and the DOE, is held to be dischargeable.
Robert F. Hershner, Jr. (Retired)
The attorney for the Chapter 7 trustee filed an application for interim compensation. The court applied the factors listed in 11 U.S.C.A. § 330(a)(3) in awarding interim compensation.
The creditor financed the Chapter 13 debtor's purchase of a vehicle. The creditor's claim was secured by a purchase money security interest in a motor vehicle that was acquired within the 910 days preceding the date the debtor filed for bankruptcy relief. The creditor contended that the vehicle was "acquired for the personal use of the debtor" and that its claim was protected from bifurcation by the hanging paragraph of 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(a)(5). The court disagreed and held that a vehicle acquired for use by the non-debtor wife was not "acquired for the personal use of the debtor" and that the claim was not protected from bifurcation by the hanging paragraph.