A vehicle purchased for the primary use of a nondebtor spouse did not fall within the scope of the hanging paragraph to § 1325(a) because the was not purchased for the "personal use of the debtor." When Congress has wanted to include family or household use within a provision it has done so expressly; it did not do so in the hanging paragraph.
Opinions
The Middle District of Georgia offers opinions in PDF format, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search box above.
Please note: These opinions are not a complete inventory of all judges' decisions and are not documents of record. Official court records are available at the clerk's office.
Judge James D. Walker Jr. (Retired)
A debtor may use the motor vehicle exemption to exempt cash proceeds from the prepetition loss of a motor vehicle.
The debtor’s personal injury attorney failed to satisfy the rules of professional conduct by failing to perfect service of the complaint failing to give the debtor sufficient information to make an informed decision regarding settlement of her case, and pressuring the debtor to settle the case.
The debtor claimed an exemption of $1,000 in certain land and indicated that he intended to maximize his exemptions to the extent allowed by law. The court held that because he exempted all the value available in the property, he had exempted it in full and was entitled to any appreciation.
The court rejected the debtor’s motion to appeal in forma pauperis the order dismissing his case. The debtor did not provide the required affidavit stating that he was unable to pay the costs of appeal and he provided no other evidence demonstrating his inability to pay.
Robert F. Hershner, Jr. (Retired)
The debtors signed a Contract For Deed to purchase certain unimproved real property. The debtors were to make monthly payments for 20 years. The creditor was to convey legal title after the debtors satisfied their obligations. The debtors defaulted and filed for bankruptcy relief. The court held that the Contract For Deed had not terminated prepetition and that the unimproved real estate was not the debtors' principal residence as that term is used in 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)(4).
The deceased's Will provided that the debtor could live in the deceased's residence as long as he wanted, then the residence could be sold and divided between the debtor and his sister. The sister filed for Chapter 7 relief. The debtor later conveyed his interest in the residence to his sister. The Court held that the interest the sister received under the Will was property of her bankruptcy estate. The Court held that the debtor's bankruptcy estate could avoid as fraudulent the transfer of his interest to his sister.
The debtor's attorney asked the court to determine that attorneys are not debt relief agencies under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. No party had threatened to enforce the debt relief agency provisions against the attorney. The court held that the attorney had failed to satisfy the case or controversy requirements necessary for the exercise of judicial power.
The court denied the cross-motions for summary judgment noting that there were genuine issues of material fact as to the parties acting in good faith and fair dealing concerning certain leases.
The Chapter 11 debtor contended that the defendants' secured claims should be equitably subordinated to the claims of all other creditors. 11 U.S.C.A. § 510(c). The debtor contended that the defendants were insiders or fiduciaries for purposes of establishing the standard and burden of proof. The debtor also contended that the defendants' claims should be treated as stock redemption claims subject to no fault subordination. The court rejected both of the debtor's contentions.